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 1 
CHAPTER I 
 
AN UNLIKELY BORDER COLONY: HOW ACADIANS AND COLONIAL 
LOUISIANA SHAPED SPANISH IMPERIAL DEFENSE, 1765-1770 
 
From the close of the Seven Years War in 1763 until about 1770, the colony of 
Louisiana began a transitional period between French and Spanish dominion at the same 
time as approximately 1000 Acadians immigrated to the colony.  In 1763, the Treaty of 
Paris divided French North American holdings between the British and the Spanish 
Empires.  It reaffirmed the cession established by the Treaty of Fontainebleau in 1762 of 
all lands west of the Mississippi and the Isle of Orleans to Spain.  Other than the Isle of 
Orleans, all French territory east of the Mississippi was transferred to British dominion.  
Thus, the Mississippi became an international border, and the newly inherited Spanish 
lands became the Spanish colony of Louisiana. 
From 1765 until 1770, the Spanish colonial authorities attempted to implement 
defense policy, to shape Louisiana as a buffer, and to integrate Louisiana into the Spanish 
imperial system.  All the while, Acadian experiences in their borderland homeland of 
Acadia and of their diaspora contributed to their approach to settlement in Louisiana. 
Their response to Spanish policy was reflected in their economic role in the colony, their 
participation in trade networks, and their interaction with colonial officials, local Indians, 
and colonists.  The Acadian experience of settlement in early Spanish colonial Louisiana 
and of contact with officials and groups within the colony, therefore, illuminates local 
ability to impact the development and realization of imperial plans for the colony. 
 2 
The Acadians were a New World people who had developed over the course of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Acadia, a colony located about the Bay of 
Fundy.  Between 1755 and 1763, the British expelled them from their colonial homeland 
in an event known as the Grand Dérangement.  Acadian allegiance to their own distinct 
community developed as a result of their shared colonial borderland experience.
1
  The 
Acadians had emerged from groups of settlers, fishermen, traders, trappers, and 
adventurers predominantly of French, but also of Basque, Portuguese, Irish, and Scottish 
origins who had also intermarried during the early years with the local Micmac Indians.
2 
 
The first French settlers arrived during the 1630s, and by the early eighteenth century the 
colonists were identifying themselves as “Acadian.”3   
Acadian shared sense of identity encompassed several practices: including 
settlement based upon kinship; the use of petition as a means to collectively negotiate 
with officials; Catholicism practiced without consistent contact with clergy; and political 
neutrality.
4
  Neglected by colonial officials, the Acadians became self-reliant and 
interdependent.
5
  Rather than serving as agents of empire, the Acadians acted chiefly out 
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 3 
of concern for their own community and existence.
6
  Settlements were centered upon 
kinship and trade extended through the colony along networks of kin.
7
  Mostly agrarian 
in their subsistence, the Acadians nevertheless participated in trade for manufactured 
goods with the merchants of New England.
8
   
The French and British vied for control of Acadia, transferring it from one empire 
to the other by treaty or conquest ten times before 1710.
9
  In 1713, the Treaty of Utrecht 
placed the colony under British dominion.  A contested borderland, Acadia was never 
securely in the hands of either imperial power, and its inhabitants were unsure of which 
power would maintain hold of the colony.
10
   
Consequently, the Acadians operated for themselves as “French neutrals” rather 
than for the French or the British within this constantly shifting imperial context.  In 
addition, those living in British territory believed that their neutrality protected them from 
Indian and French reprisal in the event of another war.
 11
  Indeed, the Acadians, viewing 
themselves primarily as a people with a shared history rather than members of an empire, 
attempted to negotiate the tense border zone of the French and English in the northeast in 
order to protect themselves from violence inflicted by either empire.
12
  Acadian neutrality 
precluded them from submitting to oaths of loyalty to Great Britain.  Acadians came into 
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 4 
conflict with British officials because the officials perceived Acadian neutrality to be 
inconsistent with loyalty to Great Britain.
13
 
As the British officials in the New World began to anticipate the outbreak of the 
Seven Years War, they regarded the Acadians as suspicious subjects who might ally with 
the French.  Without consulting their superiors in England, British colonial officials born 
in the New World and holding positions in Acadia and New England designed, promoted, 
and enacted a plan to disperse the Acadians.
14
  Begun in 1755, the Grand Dérangement 
eventually expelled between 6,000 and 7,000 Acadians from Acadia.
15
 
The Acadians became a diaspora people.  First, they were shipped to the British 
North American colonies and were dispersed throughout the Atlantic World to England, 
France, and the West Indies.  Rather than destroy Acadian ethnicity, however, the Grand 
Dérangement only reinforced the sense of common identity among the exiles.  Within the 
British colonies engaged in the French and Indian War, the exiles stood apart as a French 
and Catholic colonial people, unwelcome, and resistant to assimilation.  In Europe, this 
frontier population accustomed to subsistence farming, fishing, and hunting did not fit 
into any existing social or economic niche.  Throughout their dispersal then, the Acadians 
remained a distinct minority population, which only served to reinforce group identity.
 16
  
As they immigrated to colonial Louisiana, the Acadians sought specifically to re-establish 
their communities.
17
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 5 
Although hesitant at first, encouraged by his ministers, Spanish monarch Carlos 
III acquired colonial Louisiana west of the Mississippi and the Isle of Orleans to prevent 
British encroachments into Spain‟s more valuable New World holdings and trade routes.  
The defeat of the French in the Seven Years War guaranteed their exit from North 
America. Spain‟s concern over British expansion naturally increased.  Unlike the French, 
who had also held on to Louisiana for strategic purposes to protect Canada and its 
Caribbean colonies from expansion of other empires, the Spanish intended to militarize 
its newly acquired colony.  Thus, Spain intended that the Mississippi would serve as an 
imperial border, a “barrier,” against the British.18   
 Following the Seven Years War, during the final years of French rule, colonial 
officials in Louisiana focused their efforts on the partition and transfer of the colony.  As 
governor, Jean-Jacques-Blaise D‟Abbadie‟s chief objective was to transfer French lands 
to incoming British and Spanish officials.
19
  After D‟Abbadie‟s death in early 1765, 
Governor Charles-Philippe Aubry and Commissaire-Ordonnateur Denis-Nicolas Foucault 
assumed leadership of Louisiana.  They continued the process of French withdrawal from 
now British West Florida and anticipated Spanish assumption of power in Louisiana. 
 French officials struggled to maintain peaceful relations with the newly arrived 
British and with Indian tribes.  British officials took possession of West Florida in the fall 
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 6 
of 1763 and began immediately to institute forts and to further their alliances with the 
region‟s Indians.20  Despite D‟Abbadie‟s efforts to maintain a good working relationship 
with British officials, he lamented that “the English are giving me here, Sir, more trouble 
than the Indians….They wish to understand by guaranty even the attacks that the Indians 
might make.”21  Despite joint meetings of French and English officials with Indian chiefs, 
the Indians formerly allied with the French continued to harass the English in their 
attempts to journey the Mississippi to the Illinois Country, also newly acquired.
22
   
Colonial officials also attempted to monitor the shifting populations of the Lower 
Mississippi Valley.  In 1763, the region was home to approximately “four thousand 
whites, five thousand Negro slaves, two hundred mulatto slaves, one hundred Indians 
slaves, and one hundred free people of color,” and a local Indian population of 
approximately 32,000.
23
  Following the Treaty of Paris, colonists and Indians east of the 
Mississippi began to relocate to what would become Spanish Louisiana.
24
  Petites nations 
tribes allied with the French particularly by “providing essential goods and services” such 
as the Taensas, Mobilians, Biloxis, and Alibamons were among the Indian tribes that 
relocated to the Mississippi River and Bayou Lafourche, already home to the Houmas 
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Dawson (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990) 34. 
 7 
and Chetimachas.
25
  To complicate matters, many French settlers in West Florida chose 
to relocate rather than to remain in British territory, in particular the ranchers of Alabama 
who attempted resettlement first at Pointe Coupee and shortly thereafter again in the 
Opelousas District.
26
  At the same time, the Acadians began to immigrate to Louisiana 
with the first substantial group arriving from New York in 1764.
27
 
 Financial constraints and shortage of supplies plagued the final French 
administration as it sought to cope with the strains of transition in the Lower Mississippi 
Valley.  After 1763, France reduced funding as much as possible to Louisiana, which had 
long suffered from the neglect of its mother country but especially over the course of the 
Seven Years War.  In addition, by 1764, Louisiana was undergoing a flour shortage, and 
Aubry also complained to superiors of a dearth of “arms and ammunition.”28  French 
officials hoped that the Spanish would alleviate these problems and quickly take the 
colony out of their hands. 
Antonio de Ulloa, the first Spanish governor of the colony, arrived in March 
1766.  Approximately ninety Spanish soldiers accompanied him.  With this relatively 
small force, Ulloa felt unprepared to take full possession of the colony, which resulted in 
an ambiguous joint gubernatorial authority for Ulloa and Aubry.
29
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 8 
The French and Spanish governors expressed agreement over the colony‟s 
deficiencies in the area of defense.  Aubry had written in 1765 that because of 
Louisiana‟s lack of defensive infrastructure along the Mississippi, now that the river had 
become an international border, “In order to match the opposing forces, the Spaniards 
will be compelled to construct several forts.”30  Aubry also acknowledged that the 
Spanish would need to garrison troops in the colony to keep the British in check.
31
  In the 
spring of 1766, Ulloa toured Lower Louisiana.  Communicated in correspondence with 
his superiors, Ulloa‟s observations reflected Aubry‟s earlier assessment of the colony.32  
British Indian agents were already active attempting to amass Indian allies.
33
  The Indians 
were also a significant, perhaps the most significant, element in colonial defense.  Ulloa 
commented that “it is they who tilt the scales in favor of their allies.”34 
Convinced that the colony must improve its ability to defend itself and thus better 
serve as “a buffer for the kingdoms of New Spain,” Ulloa devised a strategy in which the 
Acadians played a crucial role.
35
  He proposed establishing forts along the Mississippi at 
key locations: at Isla Real Católica at the mouth of the Mississippi; at Manchac; at 
Natchez; and at the confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi.
36
  The fort Ulloa 
proposed at Manchac was to be directly across the Iberville from British Fort Bute, and 
the fort at Natchez would be located across the Mississippi from Fort Panmure.
37
  Ulloa 
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 9 
intended settlements to accompany these forts, concluding that “the inhabitants, as 
militiamen, must be considered soldiers settled in the territory.”38  Thus, they could 
provide militia and a physical buffer along the river against British aggression.
39
   
However, Ulloa faced a problem: whom could he settle along the Mississippi?  
Thus, the Acadians, still arriving in large numbers, provided the perfect solution, or so 
Ulloa thought.  Ulloa proposed settling ten thousand Acadian families yet to immigrate to 
Louisiana along the Mississippi, and so “to populate the banks as thickly as possible.”40  
They would become his buffer settlers.  In the end, while the Acadians constituted the 
majority of settlers near the Spanish forts at Manchac and Natchez, they were not sent to 
the Missouri, although Ulloa had considered the possibility.
41
  Thus the Acadians became 
an integral ingredient in Ulloa‟s defense policy.   
Accordingly, Ulloa fostered Acadian immigration to the colony.  His superior 
Grimaldi supported the idea, and he and Aubry granted permission to Acadians in 1766 
to invite their relatives and friends to immigrate to Louisiana.
42
  Indeed, in the years 
following the dispersal, the Acadians had successfully remained in contact with their 
families and communities dispersed throughout the Atlantic World, as indicated by their 
networks of correspondence. 
43
  Responding to encouragement from Acadians settled in 
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Louisiana, several hundred Acadians arrived from Pennsylvania and Maryland from the 
fall of 1766 through 1770.
44
  Reflecting Spain‟s relative flexibility in its initial approach 
to integrating Louisiana into its colonial system, Louisiana differed from traditional 
Spanish approaches to colonization in that the Spanish were willing to foster non-Spanish 
immigration to the colony.
45
 
In 1766, Ulloa permitted the first Acadians to arrive under his watch to settle with 
kin at St. James.
46
  However, Spanish officials directed the subsequent batches of 
immigrants, who reached the colony after Ulloa had fully developed his defense plan, to 
Spanish Fort St. Gabriel d‟Iberville at Manchac in July 1767 and Fort St. Louis de 
Natchez in February 1768.
47
 
In March 1768, Ulloa promulgated the Royal Decree regulating Louisiana‟s 
commerce.  By this decree, Louisiana was granted permission to trade with Spanish 
peninsular ports, but all other trade was prohibited.  This decree signified an end to 
traditional trade with France and its colonies.  To the Spanish, the regulations that 
governed commerce in Louisiana appeared liberal; the colonists did not have to pay a 
series of duties and taxes on imports and exports required in other colonies.
48
 
On October 28, 1768, a revolt of a conglomeration of colonists led by French 
colonial elite expelled Ulloa, ending the first Spanish regime.
49
  However, within a year, 
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Spain re-asserted its authority when Alejandro O‟Reilly arrived on August17, 1769 with 
two thousand soldiers.   
Although brief, O‟Reilly‟s administration more fully incorporated Louisiana into 
the Spanish Empire.  He restructured the colonial government, eliminating the vestige of 
French rule that was the Superior Council, which he replaced with the Cabildo.  The 
successful functioning of a cabildo, or town council, in New Orleans differentiated 
Louisiana from other Spanish colonies, where these councils had lost their prominence in 
governing.
50
  Although he punished the leaders of the Revolt, O‟Reilly pardoned most 
participants including the Acadians.
51
  He also demanded that Louisiana colonists take an 
oath of loyalty to the Spanish crown, a request to which the Acadians adhered. 
O‟Reilly began by reassessing Ulloa‟s defense policy.  He chose to dismantle 
Ulloa‟s system of forts: in doing so, he decided to abandon Isla Real Católica; to leave 
Fort St. Gabriel in the hands of several German settlers and to withdraw troops; and to 
allow the Acadians at Natchez to relocate.
52
  In place of Ulloa‟s plan, O‟Reilly suggested 
simply a standing colonial militia.
53
 
Ulloa had initiated Spanish relations with the Indians, and under the subsequent 
governors, the Spanish persisted in their attempts to maintain peaceful alliances with the 
Indians in their domain.  In meetings with the Indian chiefs, O‟Reilly reaffirmed Spanish 
friendship and promised “punctuality of the annual presents.”54  Indeed, O‟Reilly 
                                                 
50
 Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America, 324-5. 
51
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52
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promptly saw to the distribution of 1,270 pesos worth of gifts to the Indians, many of 
which were years overdue.
55
   
One of O‟Reilly‟s chief objectives was to implement the economic policies Ulloa 
had decreed in 1768 on behalf of the Spanish Crown, which meant the elimination of 
trade between Louisiana and its British neighbor and the French West Indies.
56
  Within a 
few weeks of arriving in New Orleans, O‟Reilly expelled British merchants and traders 
from the colony.  These merchants only needed to remove to British West Florida, which 
only served to exacerbate the forbidden trade.
57
   
 Leaving the colony in the hands of Governor Luis de Unzaga, O‟Reilly‟s 
departure for Cuba in March 1770 marked the transition of Louisiana into the jurisdiction 
of the Captaincy General of Cuba, and its integration into the Spanish Empire.  Havanna 
had served as Spain‟s main base in the struggle for the North American Southeast, Gulf 
Coast, and Caribbean and would continue to do so.   
 Spain accepted Louisiana from the defeated French Empire in 1763 solely for 
strategic purposes.  In September of 1770, O‟Reilly noted: “I consider Louisiana very 
useful and desirable for the king to have, for the reason that it assures his realms on that 
side indisputable boundaries.”58  The policies implemented by the early Spanish 
governors of the colony reflect this perspective.   
Spanish policies also oftentimes reflected the failure of officials and policy 
makers to consider the realities of life in the colony or the concerns of the colonists 
involved.  Consequently, this failure created tensions between local interests and imperial 
                                                 
55
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56
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 O‟Reilly to Grimaldi, Madrid, 30 Sept 1770, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 183-186. 
 13 
designs.  Circumstances on the ground in Louisiana, including Acadian settlement and 
integration into the colony, conflicted with Spanish plans for the colony.  
 In Louisiana, imperial-local tensions produced a departure from the specific 
dictates of Spanish policies for the colony and its inhabitants.  Several factors contributed 
to this development.  Despite the insistent nature of Spanish policy and the sometimes 
unbending attitude of officials, the failure of the Spanish Empire to provide financing to 
the colony inhibited the realization of policy goals.  In addition, Spanish plans were 
further hampered by Acadian interests and expectations, particularly an anticipation of 
settling in kinship groups, the interaction of the immigrants with other colonists, with 
Indians, and with officials, and the trade networks in which the colonists engaged for 
survival and profit.  Along with other inhabitants of the colony, the Acadians through 
their active resistance, the pursuit of their own interests, and the process of relative 
integration into the colony prevented Spanish policy from being realized in the way 
intended by officials and policy makers.  At the stage of policy implementation, local 
realities and interests were able to divert the realization of policy from its intended 
course. 
 During the final years of French possession of Louisiana and throughout the Ulloa 
administration, financial constraints limited the ability of officials to seek the defense 
interests of the Spanish Empire.  Initially, both the French and the Spanish administrators 
sought to provide supplies to assist the Acadians in establishing themselves.  However, 
Ulloa‟s attitude towards the Acadians underwent a major shift as he became increasingly 
pressed for funds.  Interestingly, the French officials were more willing to alter their 
plans than to blame the immigrant Acadians for the deficiencies of the administration. 
 14 
Although the French attempted to consider both the Spanish strategic and local 
interests, shortages of supplies forced them to reconsider their plans on occasion.  In 
February of 1765, Aubry settled approximately 230 Acadians in the western district of 
the Attakapas in large part because of the shortages the colony was facing at the time.  
Under the leadership of Joseph Broussard “Beausoleil,” these Acadians had traveled from 
Nova Scotia via Saint Domingue.
59
  Aubry‟s initial intention was to settle them along the 
Mississippi River where “their presence will be essential to the Spaniards.”60  However, 
because of floods along the Mississippi, he realized that it would be less costly to the 
colony to send the Acadians west.  Consequently, he and Foucault assisted them with 
supplies and sent them to the Attakapas District.  Although forced to abandon their 
original settlement plans for this party of exiles, Aubry and Foucault hoped that the 
Acadians would nevertheless serve Spanish interests in the western districts by 
contributing to the development of ranching.
61
  In May 1765, while Aubry and Foucault 
had intended to settle eighty Acadians in the western districts with the Beausoleil party, 
the restrictively low supplies in New Orleans forced them to settle these Acadians along 
the Mississippi with earlier groups of Acadian immigrants instead.
62
   
During Ulloa‟s administration, funding for Louisiana was supposed to come 
through Mexico.  However, it never materialized.
63
  The French colonial government was 
already in debt when Ulloa arrived.  In addition to assuming French debt, Ulloa began to 
institute the costly defense plan and the accompanying settlement plan for the Acadians, 
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which included the building of forts, settlement expeditions, and supplies for the 
impoverished immigrants.  At the same time, the governor attempted to provide for the 
general costs of governing, to pay for Spanish civil and military officials in Louisiana.   
Because of the scarcity of resources available for the French colonial 
administration by the end of the Seven Years War, by the time Ulloa arrived in 
Louisiana, the colony was several years in debt to the powerful Choctaws.  Ulloa noted 
that the Choctaw, now living in British territory, began demanding their gifts for the 
years 1761 and 1762, “threatening war if denied.”64  In comparison to the 25,000 pesos 
he suggested to finance aid to the Acadians at this time, Ulloa requested an 8,000 peso 
allotment for the gifts to the Indians.
65
  Indeed maintaining payments of gifts to the 
Indians was key to maintaining peaceful alliances with them, otherwise the Indians, 
particularly the Choctaw, might resort to aggression, as the French officials advised the 
early Spanish administration.  However, by 1767, Ulloa‟s financial constraints, like those 
of the French colonial government that had preceded him, prevented him from repaying 
the gifts for the years of 1761 and 1762.  Just as they had previously with the French, the 
Choctaw responded with threats of waging war against the Spanish if they did not receive 
their backpayment of gifts.
66
 
Ulloa passed 1767 and 1768 lamenting “the peril in which the colony finds itself,” 
begging his superiors to send funding to pay off the creditors who had been growing in 
number since before his arrival in the colony, and noting that improvements in colonial 
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defense and infrastructure required greater expenditure.
67
  Ulloa received several 
allotments from Cuba in response to his pleas, but never enough to stabilize the colony.
68
   
During August and September 1768, the British withdrew from Fort Panmure and 
Fort Bute.
69
  Ulloa had based his entire defense strategy around British presence on the 
Mississippi River.  He had expended increasingly precious resources implementing his 
plans. 
These British actions caused Ulloa both relief and consternation.  On one hand the 
proximity of the British threat had been removed.  However, on the other hand, Ulloa 
worried that “our cares will be increased by the Indians dependent upon the two English 
forts and who are on their side, as it is probable that they will come to our side, or even 
here, to beg as is their custom.”70  Thus, the financial burden on Spanish settlements 
would increase.  Ulloa had been suspicious of the British, but shortly after their 
withdrawal, he argued that they had offered the Spanish a viable model: “England now 
teaches us to economize by abandoning whatever it considers unable to produce any 
advantage, and without renouncing its dominion or rights, reduces its government to a 
civil one…”71  Such a policy would significantly reduce Spanish expenses.   
The financial constraints that Ulloa faced continued to worsen and influenced 
shifts in his attitude toward the Acadians and policy of colonial Louisiana.  Indeed, Ulloa 
extended his frustration to the Acadians. Previously he had lauded the Acadians for their 
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industry, now he lamented the expenditure they had cost him.
72
  In October of 1768, 
Ulloa lamented the colony‟s expenditure on the Acadian settlements “which are 
dependent upon them and must be protected from the attacks they might suffer from the 
Indians.”73   
The financial crisis that engulfed the colony during the French years extended into 
the first years of Spanish rule.  While the shortages in supplies altered French plans for 
Acadian settlement, the failure of the Spanish to provide funding to Ulloa undermined his 
authority within the colony and made the realization of his defense policy untenable. 
Two key factors contributing to the Revolt of 1768 were the overwhelming state 
of bankruptcy of the colony and its inhabitants, and the restrictive Spanish commercial 
policies Ulloa issued in March 1768.  
 The Revolt of 1768 represented collective colonial resistance to the Spanish 
policies during Ulloa‟s regime.  Colonists of Louisiana, including a large number of 
Acadians took part in the revolt.  Acadians joined colonial planters, merchants, and 
German Coast residents in opposing the Spanish administration.  In conjunction with his 
defense policy, Ulloa‟s refusal to take official possession of Louisiana, his lack of 
funding, and Spanish commercial policy, all motivated Louisiana‟s colonists to unite in 
the Revolt of 1768 that ended Ulloa‟s term in Louisiana. 
Led by leading merchants and planters, the Revolt of October 1768 was primarily 
the response of colonists to Spanish commercial policies promulgated by Ulloa.  These 
instigators lamented that the products of Louisiana had no economic niche in the Spanish 
Empire as they did within the French Empire and the French Caribbean.  In addition, 
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many merchants and planters were precariously in debt.
74
  Conspirators built on German 
Coast residents‟ displeasure with Ulloa‟s commercial regulations, which dictated the 
markets to which German Coast settlers could export their tobacco, cotton, and indigo.  
In addition, the conspirators circulated rumors among the Germans and Acadians that the 
colonial government would not reimburse the colonists for the grain it had confiscated to 
feed the incoming Acadians.
75
 
Acadian suspicion of the Spanish colonial government had been mounting during 
1767 and 1768 as they increasingly came into conflict over Ulloa‟s defense-settlement 
plans.  In the fall of 1768, the conspirators of the revolt indicated to the Acadians that 
Ulloa intended to sell them to the British to cover the expenses he had incurred to settle 
them.  While such tales were inaccurate, Ulloa had corresponded with the British in West 
Florida about indenturing the Acadians, justifying Acadian suspicion.
76
  While most free 
peoples rebel against loss of freedom, for the Acadians, the threat built upon particular 
predisposition to fear abuse and misuse at the hands of imperial colonial authorities.  The 
rumors may have touched upon a fear of indentured servitude among the Acadians.  One 
of their grievances while under British rule in the thirteen colonies was the intention of 
the British to separate parents and children by means of indenturing Acadians.
77
  Further, 
Acadian suspicion of colonial governments in general is likely given their experiences of 
abuse in Acadia and after the expulsion.  The Acadians were possibly wary of abuse at 
the hands of the Spanish, who had already separated kinship groups in their settlement 
plan.  Acadian distrust of the Spanish must have been noted enough for leaders of the 
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revolt to take advantage of it.  Approximately two hundred Acadians from the First and 
Second Acadian Coast participated in the Revolt of 1768.
 78
  Given that the census of 
Cabahannocé of 1769 listed 163 “men bearing arms” in the district, a high percentage of 
Acadian men from the district most likely participated in the Revolt, which underlines 
their displeasure with the Spanish regime.
79
  In the end, Ulloa‟s policy of forced 
settlement backfired.  His intention of defending colonial Louisiana from attack with a 
system of forts and settlements actually incited disloyalty and suspicion among the 
Acadian colonists. Acadian participation in the Revolt of 1768 revealed the extent to 
which they opposed Ulloa as a group and sheds light on other points of contention 
between provincial concerns and the policies implemented by Ulloa. 
 Despite conflict between the Acadians and other colonists of Louisiana, Acadian 
participation in the Revolt of 1768 indicates a certain level of integration and cohesion of 
the immigrants with the colony.  The challenges that the Spanish regime appeared to pose 
to the colonists served as a uniting force against Spanish defense and commercial policy 
that the colonists believed contradicted their own interests.  The extreme debt in which 
the colony found itself, the inadequate funds from Cuba and the promulgation of Spanish 
commercial policy contributed to instability in the colony and fostered the Revolt of 
1768.
80
  Instead of bringing Louisiana into the Spanish Empire, the commercial policy 
spurred the colonists on to Revolt against Spain altogether, and some even to petition 
France to take back the colony.
81
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Relations between the colony and the Indians of the Lower Mississippi Valley and 
between the Acadians and the Indians further complicated Spanish aspirations for the 
colony.  The British and Spanish both hoped to sustain significant networks of Indian 
alliances, a situation that only served to exacerbate tensions along the Mississippi River 
where Ulloa intended to settle the Acadians in 1767 and 1768.  Ulloa had anticipated that 
immigrant Acadians, eager for land grants, would simply settle according to the dictate of 
his defense plan in return for Spanish generosity.  However, Ulloa‟s strategizing had not 
accounted for the possibility of Acadian resistance, even though Fort St. Gabriel and Fort 
St. Louis de Natchez were both dangerous frontier posts exposed to Indian raids.   
The experiences of the Acadians whom Ulloa settled at St. Gabriel and St. Louis 
de Natchez made them wary of Indians in general.  These Acadians originated from the 
Minas Basin in Acadia, which had been an area particularly subject to French and 
Micmac raids from the 1740s onward.
 82
  In New England, the French and English had a 
long history of striking at one another‟s colonies by promoting their Indian allies to wage 
war and conduct raids against their enemies.
83
  Having previously been victims of inter-
colonial violence, the Acadians who settled at St. Gabriel and St. Louis sought to avoid 
settlements that might replicate such hazardous conditions.
84
   
Nor were the Acadians at St. Louis de Natchez and St. Gabriel unjustified in their 
fear of Indian attack.  Prior to their arrival at Fort St. Gabriel, the commandant José de 
Orieta noted that Indians of various tribes, such as the Biloxi and Choctaw, frequented 
the post for gifts, food, and cloth, and further he indicated that the Indians told him that 
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the fort was their land.
85
  The Alabama and Houma were also in close proximity.
86
  The 
British traded with these Indians, providing them brandy in particular, after the 
consumption of which they arrived at the St. Gabriel post intoxicated.
87
  St. Gabriel was 
situated enough among local Indians that Ulloa and Aubry were compelled to find an 
interpreter who could speak several Indian languages.
88
  Ulloa‟s instructions to Pedro 
Piernas for the settlement of the Acadians at Natchez included a provision that the settlers 
learn how to defend themselves against an Indian attack.  Indian raids were a strong 
enough possibility that the settlements along the Mississippi River were provided canons, 
which they could use to signal danger of such an attack.
89
  When Piernas issued land 
grants to the Acadians in May 1768, he provided them with instructions on the meaning 
of different cannon and flag signals from the fort, where to go “in the event of an Indian 
raid,” and how to conduct themselves with the Indians “to insure their own security.”90  
Colonial officials were aware of the dangers that the frontier posed to colonists.   
Tensions between Acadians and the Indians also emerged at St. James and 
Ascension.  The Houmas and the Tensas, became concerned that expansion of Acadian 
settlements would jeopardize their own villages and displace them.
91
  The Tensas 
complained to Ulloa of conflict with the commandant Nicolas Verret and the Acadians at 
Cabahannocé, causing Ulloa to beseech Verret “not to harass them in any way and on the 
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contrary, to be well disposed toward them”92  By late 1767, Judice and Verret were 
prepared to use cannons to signal alarm, “if the Indian tribes should decide to raid the 
residents in the settlement.”93   
The close proximity of the British enemy across the river and the competition 
among the British and Spanish for Indian alliances served to reinforce Acadian anxieties 
along the emerging militarized border.  As the Spanish and British Indian agents vied for 
Indian loyalty in the region, relations among the colonists and Indians became 
increasingly tense.
94
  Indeed, the British at Fort Panmure were building an alliance with 
both the Choctaw and Chickasaw, the most powerful and populous Indians of the 
region.
95
  Ulloa recognized the power that the Choctaws wielded: “this is a tribe which 
could destroy various settlements of the colony.”96  He also recognized that the British 
settlement could not “control the Indians” without military presence.97  At St. James and 
Ascension, both Indians and settlers of Louisiana lived in trepidation of the Creek, also 
allies of the British.
98
  Thus, the Acadians feared the Indians both in Louisiana and across 
the Mississippi. 
Indeed, the Acadians settled along the Mississippi do not appear to have joined 
the Spanish in cementing alliances with Indians in Louisiana proper, nor did they express 
a particular willingness to prove themselves “good marksmen…capable of effectively 
waging war against the Indians.”99  Instead, the Acadians of St. James and Ascension and 
                                                 
92
 Ulloa to Judice, New Orleans, 19 Nov 1768, Quest for the Promised Land, 106. 
93
 Judice to Ulloa, Cabannocé, 12 Sept 1767, and Ulloa to Judice, New Orleans, 19 Nov 1768, Quest for the 
Promised Land, 98, 106; Chandler, “Odyssey Continued,” 449. 
94
 Brasseaux, Founding of New Acadia, 181-2; Brasseaux, “Acadian Life in the Lafourche Country,” 37. 
95
 Brasseaux, Founding of New Acadia, 181. 
96
 Governmental Expenses, New Orleans, 1767, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 18. 
97
 Ulloa to Grimaldi, New Orleans, 23 Aug 1768, and 6 Oct 1768, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 70, 71. 
98
 Brasseaux, Founding of New Acadia,182. 
99
 Ulloa to Grimaldi, New Orleans,19 May 1766, Quest for the Promised Land, 67. 
 23 
the neighboring Indians came into conflict, and the Acadians of Fort St. Louis de Natchez 
and Fort St. Gabriel expressed apprehension over their exposure to potential Indian attack 
and argued that it was reason enough for the Spanish to allow them to relocate.  Thus, 
along the Mississippi River, Acadian-Indian relations undermined colonial-Indian 
alliances, which the Spanish viewed as crucial to any plan of defensive success.  In 
addition, exposure to Indian aggression gave the Acadians reason to protest Ulloa‟s 
settlement plan. 
 Acadians actively resisted Ulloa‟s defense policy.  As they had in Acadia and 
throughout the diaspora, the Acadians in Louisiana employed petitions as their means to 
express grievances to colonial officials.  Fear of exposure to the Indian attack continued 
to motivate them.  In addition, many arrived in Louisiana anticipating settlement in kin-
based communities of their choosing.   
The Acadian immigrants who disembarked in 1767 and 1768 arrived unaware of 
their role in Ulloa‟s defense plan.  They believed that they would be allowed to settle 
with relatives already established in the colony.  Ulloa may have unwittingly bolstered 
the false hopes of many of these Acadians when during 1766 he granted lands to 
incoming Acadians “next to those who are already settled,” in keeping with precedents 
set by the outgoing French colonial government.
100
  Nevertheless, maintaining French 
settlement precedents was not Ulloa‟s interest, especially not after he fixed his sights on 
buttressing Louisiana‟s defense by settling the exiles as buffers along the Mississippi.  
Ulloa overlooked Acadian intent to reestablish their communities, kinship based 
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settlements as had been their tradition in Acadia before the expulsion.  As a result, 
conflict between Acadians and colonial officials ensued.
101
   
Spanish officials resorted to coercion in response to Acadian resistance to 
settlement near Manchac.  With regard to the 210 Acadians who arrived from Maryland 
in July of 1767, Ulloa noted that “we had all of the trouble in the world to subject them to 
our arrangements,” namely to force them to settle near Fort St. Gabriel rather than with 
relatives at St. James.
102
  According to Ulloa, it was only by threat of deportation that he 
could persuade these Acadians to accept settlement at Fort St. Gabriel.
103
 
Acadian resistance to travel to St. Louis de Natchez appears to have been even 
greater.  This group of about 150 Acadians, also sailing from Maryland, arrived in New 
Orleans in February 4, 1768 and like the Acadians who preceded them were promptly 
granted rations and assistance by Spanish colonial officials.
104
  They began to 
demonstrate opposition to the plan after stopping at Cabahannocé on their way to St. 
Louis de Natchez, where perhaps they became better informed about the proposed 
settlement site and of the coercion experienced by the Acadians sent to St. Gabriel.  The 
Acadians en route to St. Louis de Natchez were themselves a kin-based community 
hoping to re-congregate with extended family already separated between the 
Cabahannocé and St. Gabriel posts.
105
  Pedro Piernas indicates in correspondence from 
1768 that he also threatened this group of Acadians with deportation should they 
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challenge the settlement plans for them.
106
  Over the course of the Mississippi River 
voyage to their destination, they protested, and several families attempted to leave the 
expedition at St. Gabriel.
107
  In an attempt to counteract Acadian attitude towards the 
prescribed settlement sites, Ulloa gave his officials instructions to remind the Acadians of 
“the great advantages afforded by settlement in this colony.”  Nevertheless, the Acadians 
at St. Louis de Natchez persisted for several years in their complaints about the hazards 
of the frontier where they were stationed.
108
 
Acadians at St. Louis de Natchez revealed their perception of the Indians as a 
threat through their petitions and complaints to officials, a continuation of their 
traditional practice for conducting negotiations with colonial officials.  Immediately upon 
reaching St. Louis, the Acadians expressed to Verret and Piernas their concerns about the 
isolation of the site and that they “would live in constant fear” because of the threat of 
Indian attack.
109
  After settlement sites had been determined, the Acadians argued that 
some of their number were too far from the fort for it to provide them any protection in 
case of attack or danger from the British and the Indians.
110
 
Once O‟Reilly reached Louisiana in 1769, the Acadians at Natchez lost little time 
in petitioning him regarding their “desire to abandon” the settlement.  The litany of 
reasons for their request beginning “that they find themselves continually in danger of 
being killed by the divers Savage Nations who make war.”  The commandant of the post 
Jean Delavillebeuvre and the engineer Gui Dufossat corroborated the legitimacy of this 
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fear and coupled it with concern for the quality of the land on which the Acadians had 
been settled and the great distance between the fort and New Orleans.
111
  After consulting 
Aubry, O‟Reilly decided to honor the request of the Acadians, justifying his decision on 
economic grounds as well as because “the inhabitants settled at Natchez could in no way 
contribute to the defense or support of the colony.”  He argued the fort and settlement 
were an unnecessary cost for the crown and that they “served as a pretext for continual 
expenditures for the Indians who came there.”  Paramount to O‟Reilly‟s concern for the 
fort was that its removal from the capital would encourage contraband trade.
 112
 
 Through their persistence, the Acadians exhibited that they would not subjugate 
their own practices and concerns to conforming with Ulloa‟s defense-settlement plans but 
quite the contrary.  Ulloa had overlooked the possibility that his new colonists might 
oppose the dangerous and removed locations of their settlements at Iberville and Natchez, 
but particularly Natchez.  O‟Reilly‟s decision to allow the Acadians at Natchez to 
relocate was based in part upon the “indefensible” nature of St. Louis de Natchez and St. 
Gabriel.
113
  His primary objective remained integrating Louisiana into the Spanish system 
and enabling it to function as an effective barrier.  Consequently, he concerned himself 
with securing the loyalty of Louisiana‟s colonists, promoting defense, and eliminating 
contraband trade.  Certainly allowing the Acadians to relocate promoted their loyalty to 
the new Spanish administration.  However, the networks of trade in which Acadians 
engaged did not appear to the Spanish to bespeak of loyalty. 
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 Trade networks tied the inhabitants of the Lower Mississippi Valley together, but 
not necessarily in alliances that conformed to Spanish commercial decree.  In reality, 
trade that best served the interests of colonists, whether those of survival or profit, often 
contradicted official commercial policy and appeared to also undermine Spanish defense 
interests. 
Ulloa believed that the Acadians were an ideal population to place alongside the 
expansion-minded British of West Florida because of the turbulent history of Acadian-
British relations.
114
  However, the hostilities experienced at the hands of the British did 
not preclude the Acadians from pursuing their own interests, which encouraged them to 
interact with the British across the river and the Indians, who provided them access to 
“meat, grease, lard, etc.”115   
Contraband trade and trade with British merchants were not new to the Acadians.  
In Acadia, they had traded with the British of Massachusetts; in Louisiana, with the 
British of West Florida.
116
  Thus, the Acadians, a people who had developed in a 
borderland, began to operate adeptly in the new emerging borderland of colonial 
Louisiana, undermining Spanish defense interests in turn.  While Ulloa did respond with 
instructions to the commandants of the various posts that trade between Spain and 
England was not sanctioned, official efforts were to little avail.
117
 
Unintentionally then, the Spanish undermined their own intentions for 
establishing Louisiana as a barrier by providing the opportunity and need for illicit trade 
between Louisiana and West Florida.  The Spanish suffered chronically from the inability 
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to supply their New World colonies with the manufactured goods that they demanded.  
Governor George Johnstone of West Florida anticipated that the inadequacy of the 
Spanish supply to Louisiana would encourage the Spanish subjects to turn to West 
Florida to trade.
118
   
Upon his arrival, O‟Reilly was greatly distressed at the entrenchment of British 
merchants within the colony and at the illicit trade occurring along the Mississippi River.  
He lamented that he “found the English entirely in possession of the commerce of this 
colony.”119  Indeed, out of necessity, Ulloa had tolerated the presence of British 
merchants in New Orleans to alleviate the shortage of necessary supplies, such as flour, 
with which Spain was unable to provide the colony, and to purchase Louisiana‟s 
agricultural commodities and furs and skins from their trade with the Indians.
120
   
In addition, because the Treaty of Paris in 1763 had granted the British the right to 
navigate the Mississippi, their presence on the river could not be uprooted, allowing 
colonists of Spanish Louisiana continual easy access to the goods that they peddled on 
their floating warehouses.
121
  Indeed, to the chagrin of the Spanish, contraband trade 
continued to be the “lifeblood of Louisiana.” 122  Although O‟Reilly attempted to define 
Louisiana more exactly as a barrier through stricter implementation of Spanish policy, his 
efforts were unable to prevent the vibrant contraband trade in the colony from continuing.   
Recognizing that the only means of survival for the settlers at Natchez was 
“illegal trade,” O‟Reilly argued that removing the Acadians from Natchez furthered the 
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interests of the colony.
123
  The illegal trade between St. Louis de Natchez and the British 
across the Mississippi was of international concern.  Therefore, he hoped that abandoning 
the Natchez post would eliminate the problem.   
Settled along or near the Mississippi River as they were, the Acadians continued 
to take advantage of these opportunities for trade, prohibited though they may have been.  
Particularly well situated, were the British at Manchac.  Some commodities such as butter 
were perishable, so trade with the British was feasible whereas sending such goods to 
New Orleans was not.
 124
  Because the Spanish had set price controls for grain in New 
Orleans, the Acadians faired better trading with the British.
 125
  Later, Governor Luis de 
Unzaga lamented during the corn and rice shortage of 1770 that “the farmers do not wish 
to descend to sell them”126  Although Verret protested that the residents of his post at 
Cabahannocé had not in fact traded the precious grain to the enemy across the river, 
Unzaga would not be convinced, and he instructed Verret to inventory the grain on the 
farms in his district and send excess grain to New Orleans.
127
   
In addition to the grain shortage, Louisiana continued to suffer economically from 
the implications of Spain‟s commercial policies. Although, at O‟Reilly‟s suggestion, 
Spain had granted Louisiana trading rights with Havana, the markets and needs of the 
two ports did not coincide adequately to provide for the needs of Louisiana.
128
  In 
addition, again at O‟Reilly‟s suggestion, export of tobacco from Louisiana to Havana was 
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forbidden.
129
  Louisiana‟s colonists, such as those at Pointe Coupée, turned then to the 
British to sell this cash crop.
130
  Thus, the contraband trade between the British and 
Spanish subjects actually grew during Unzaga‟s governorship.131   
 Similarly, defiance of Spanish trade policies in the western districts also 
contributed to the strengthening of colonial Louisiana.  Indeed, although O‟Reilly 
attempted to crack down on smuggling between Texas and Louisiana, after his departure 
the trade resumed and increased.  Because of the friendly relations between colonists and 
the Indians of these western districts, trade with the Attakapas and Opelousas Indians 
particularly in furs, cattle, and horses developed across the colonies of Texas and 
Louisiana.  Indeed, in all probability, the cattle and horses traded in these western 
districts were stolen from Texas.  The Attakapas Indians, settled mostly to the west of the 
Attakapas and Opelousas settlements, and the Acadians both participated in driving the 
herds into Louisiana and in raising the livestock in these western districts.
 132
  O‟Reilly 
had hoped to foster the development of vacheries in the Opelousas and Attakapas 
Districts, particularly as a source of provisions in case of war.
133
  Already in 1770, Juan 
Kelly and Eduardo Nugent, sent by O‟Reilly to survey the colony and administer loyalty 
oaths, noted that in Opelousas “the raising of cattle is the natives‟ sole occupation,” and 
that in the Attakapas, “the Acadians have settled there and raised cattle.”134 This trade, 
particularly in livestock, enabled Acadians and other colonists settled at the Attakapas 
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and Opelousas posts to develop their own vacheries, which became an important source 
of beef for the colony during the American Revolution.
135 
 Thus, at the start of the 1770s, 
the Acadians in the Opelousas and Attakapas Districts through their illegal trade network 
were posed to participate in supporting the colony in time of war with beef and livestock. 
The vibrant contraband trade of the Lower Mississippi Valley was indeed the 
“lifeblood” of the colony, but it undercut Spanish commercial policy outright.  Further, a 
considerable portion of the trade took place between Louisiana‟s colonists and the enemy 
across the Mississippi.  The nature of the illegal trade in which the Acadians participated 
thwarted the Spanish efforts to establish a barrier colony.  Ironically, the persistence of 
the illicit trade contributed to the survival and strengthening of the colony such that it 
enabled Louisiana in the following decade, upon Spain‟s entry into the American 
Revolution to go beyond its intended defensive role and to conquer British West 
Florida.
136
   
Clearly, the reality of life in colonial Louisiana and Acadian resistance prevented 
the realization of specific Spanish prescriptions for the colony.  The financial strains 
endured by the French and Spanish colonial administrations of the 1760s prevented 
successful enactment of settlement policy and, in the case of the Spanish, significantly 
undermined the authority of the colonial government.  Louisiana‟s colonists expressed 
their outright opposition to Spanish commercial and defense policy in the Revolt of 1768 
that removed Governor Antonio de Ulloa from the colony.  While Spanish officials 
recognized a successful Indian policy as key to success in defending the colony, the 
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proximity of Acadian settlements to neighboring Indian villages and the fear of Indians 
harbored by Acadians along the Mississippi River complicated alliances.  Indeed, the 
Acadians repeatedly resisted settlement at Ulloa‟s strategically placed forts at Manchac 
and Natchez, so critical to his defense strategy for the colony.  Nevertheless, their 
proximity to the British along the Mississippi fostered an illegal trade that undercut both 
Spanish defense and commercial policies and the notion that the Mississippi served as a 
veritable boundary between British North America and the barrier colony of Louisiana. 
In attempting to define Louisiana as a barrier, integrate it into the Spanish 
imperial system, and establish effective defense, Spanish policy did not permit local 
interests and imperial interests to inform one another.  Rather, officials mandated policy 
that ignored local interests.  Consequently, the divergent interests of the Spanish and the 
inhabitants of Louisiana produced friction.  While Spanish officials might dictate policy 
and attempt to enforce it, the realities of life and survival, combined with the interests of 
colonists, including the Acadians, inhibited the implementation of the Spanish blueprint 
for commercial and defense policy.  Through the agency of their own persistence and 
resistance to Spanish imperial plans, the Acadians effected their own settlement and 
participation in the economy of the colony.   The local influence on the implementation 
of the policy speaks to the strength of Acadian agency and local response to shape the 
realization of Spanish policy.   
In spite of the pervasive contraband trade, O‟Reilly‟s governorship initiated better 
relations between the Spanish regime and the Acadian colonists.  Rather than accuse the 
Acadians at Natchez of disobedience and ungratefulness as Ulloa and his subordinates 
had, O‟Reilly acknowledged the legitimacy of the Acadians‟ objection to the settlement.  
 33 
He recognized Acadian willingness to relocate at their own expense after having worked 
the land for two years as proof of their honesty.
 137
  The Acadians for their part chose to 
take the oath of loyalty to Spain, which indicated a major shift in the Acadians‟ 
traditional perception of themselves.
138
  They had been self-proclaimed French neutrals 
whose persistent refusal to take an oath of loyalty to the British had in large part led to 
their expulsion from Acadia. While Louisiana and its inhabitants underwent an initial 
shift from French empire to a transitional French and Spanish joint rule to greater 
incorporation into the Spanish imperial system, the Acadians endured their own transition 
as a diaspora people setting roots in Louisiana where they continued to develop with the 
colony.  The Acadians in no small part were integrated into the fabric of the colony by 
1770.  Although they maintained their own identity, they had become and remained 
critical to the colony‟s development. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
BRITISH AND AMERICAN MERCHANTS AND EXPANDING TRADE 
NETWORKS IN THE BORDERLANDS OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY 
 
Spain acquired Louisiana in 1762 to serve as a buffer to protect its more valuable 
New World holdings from British expansion.  When Spain regained East and West 
Florida after the American Revolution, Spain intended them to serve as buffer colonies as 
well.
139
  While it was perhaps understood to a point that colonists in a borderland might 
engage in contraband trade with the British, it was also essential to the Spanish Empire 
that the region remain a buffer zone.  British and American trade in the Mississippi 
Valley and the inability of Spanish officials to prevent or to control it would prove to be 
the undoing of this Spanish imperial strategy. Between 1765 and 1790, British and 
American commercial networks expanded throughout the region, both strengthening the 
Spanish colonies by fitting within the existing frontier exchange network, and 
challenging Spanish attempts to use Louisiana and later East and West Florida as an 
imperial border.   
British trade practices presented a policy problem for Spanish colonial officials.  
Following the Seven Years War, the British were able to take control of the former 
French forts east of the Mississippi.  Further, the Treaty of Paris permitted free access to 
the Mississippi to both Britain and Spain, providing a locus for the opportunistic 
expansion of British networks of merchants.  During these early years of Spanish rule, 
Spanish officials attempted simultaneously to develop Louisiana as a military buffer and 
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to balance the persistent contraband trade between Louisiana colonists and British 
merchants, traders, and planters.  With the coming of the American Revolution, Spain 
provided aid to the rebelling American colonies and entered the war in an attempt to 
recover the Floridas and Gibraltar.  This pro-American policy, strengthened ties between 
Spanish North American colonies and the emerging United States.  However, following 
the war, the spread of American settlements through the Ohio River Valley and later 
along the Cumberland posed a threat to Spanish sense of security.  Spanish immigration, 
defense, and commercial policy reflected this fear both in imperial and local contexts.  
The sheer numbers of British and Americans involved in trade and settlement throughout 
the Mississippi Valley increased dramatically between 1765 and 1790 to a level such that 
it forced the Spanish both to constantly re-evaluate Spanish policies concerning trade, the 
maintenance of Indian alliances, and immigration as Spain struggled to effectively create 
a protective “„barrera,”‟ and to eventually acknowledge the presence of the unwanted 
commerce.
140
 
In short, Spanish commercial policy forbade trade outside of the Spanish Empire 
and restricted trade among its colonies to certain Spanish ports.
141
  On March 23, 1768, 
Antonio de Ulloa, the first Spanish governor of Louisiana, promulgated Spanish 
commercial regulations for the first time in the colony.
142
 While from a Spanish 
perspective it seemed a liberal measure to permit Louisiana tp trade with nine Spanish 
peninsular ports, residents of colonial Louisiana perceived these regulations as a threat to 
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their own survival.
143
  Rejection of Spanish commercial policy was chief among the 
complaints of the colonists who expelled Ulloa from New Orleans in late October of 
1768.
144
  In August 1769, General Alejandro O‟Reilly arrived in Louisiana prepared to 
take the colony firmly into the Spanish realm.  He intended to enforce Spanish 
commercial dominance, expelling the British merchants from New Orleans and issuing 
new regulations that opened up trade with Cuba.
145
  O‟Reilly left Louisiana in 1770, 
leaving his successor, the new governor Luis de Unzaga, to enforce Spanish policy.
146
   
Nevertheless, the reality of life in colonial Louisiana reveals that decree policy as 
they might, Spanish governors and officials could not control trade in the Lower 
Mississippi Valley.  And while Spanish officials looked to Louisiana mostly for strategic 
value, British merchants and officials almost immediately recognized the region as a 
potentially fertile economic frontier because of the dearth of manufactured goods, 
because of restrictive Spanish commercial policy, and because the Mississippi River was 
a key artery in the deerskin and fur trade.   
It was widely accepted that West Florida would benefit the British Empire 
economically as a base for illicit trade with Spanish colonies.
147
  British manufacturers, 
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including some merchants based in the West Indies, expressed their wish that parliament 
sanction trade between Spanish colonies and West Florida.
148
  The first governor of 
British West Florida George Johnstone anticipated that Spanish colonists would turn to 
West Florida to trade when Spain was unable to adequately supply the colony.
149
  Indeed, 
British governors Johnstone and Chester desired that Pensacola be named a free port, like 
Jamaica, to foster trade with Spanish colonies about the Gulf of Mexico and 
Caribbean.
150
 Additionally, the British had a head start, for they took possession of West 
Florida in 1763, and settlers began almost immediately to arrive; whereas, the Spanish 
did not arrive until 1766, and the issue of enlarging and maintaining a colonial population 
would always be problematic for them.   
Because of the confusion following the partition, British merchants gained an 
early foothold in commerce in the Lower Mississippi Valley.  After the Seven Years War, 
colonial Louisiana underwent a shortage of basic goods such as flour, “arms and 
ammunition,” and specie.151  France was unwilling to pour additional resources into this 
colony only to transfer it to Spain, but the Spanish did not take official possession of the 
colony until 1769, leaving the colonists to negotiate access to goods by their own means 
in a moment of political uncertainty.  The opportunity that trade with the British along the 
Mississippi provided for access to goods such as “flour, wine, oil, tools, arms, 
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ammunition, [and] all kinds of clothing” through the existing system of barter and 
exchange actually provided some stability to Spanish Louisiana.
152
   
Perhaps most significant to engaging the trade networks of the Lower Mississippi 
Valley was the British post at Manchac, which included a settlement with warehouses.
153
  
Johnstone identified Manchac as a future commercial center through which the fur trade 
from the Illinois country might funnel.
154
  During the 1760s, the British surveyor and 
cartographer Thomas Hutchins noted that Manchac‟s location situated it perfectly for 
trade: 
this place, if attended to, might be of consequence to the commerce of 
West-Florida; for it may with reason be supposed, that the inhabitants and 
traders who reside at Point Coupee, at Natchitoches, Attacappa, the 
Natchez, on the East side of the Mississippi and above and below the 
Natchez, at the Illinois, and St Vincents on the ouabashe, would rather 
trade at this place than at New Orleans, if they could have as good returns 
for their peltry and the produce of their country.
155
   
 
And during the early 1770s, as the Spanish struggled to establish 
themselves and to stabilize colonial Louisiana, British fur traders captured 
most of this fur trade.
156
   
For their part, colonists of Louisiana were able to provide the British of West 
Florida, and the merchants plying the River with raw goods and services.  The produce of 
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Louisiana exported to British markets included “lumber, indigo, cotton, furs, and some 
corn and rice.”157  At Manchac, colonists, such as those from the nearby Acadian 
settlements, were able to trade goods such as butter that would spoil long before reaching 
New Orleans.
158
  Ulloa had settled groups of Acadians at St. Gabriel and at St. Louis de 
Natchez initially by force as part of his defense strategy to place forts and settlements at 
strategic locations along the Mississippi River.
159
  Ironically, Ulloa had created the 
opportunity for these frontiersmen to engage in contraband trade, and because these 
outposts were far removed from New Orleans, the colonists turned to the British at the 
very least out of sheer necessity. 
Spanish officials were aware of the increasing British presence at Manchac and of 
the involvement of Louisiana‟s colonists in trade with that post.  British goods introduced 
at Manchac filtered through Natchitoches west into Texas and even New Mexico.  
O‟Reilly had attempted to squelch the contraband trade on the western frontier of 
Louisiana, but as with his efforts to eliminate the contraband along the Mississippi, he 
could not stem the long existent trade between Louisiana and Texas.
160
  British 
infiltration into these more western trade networks, particularly the Indian networks, 
concerned Spanish officials.  The British threat was real enough that in 1772, Governor 
Ripperda of Texas wrote Unzaga about rumors that “Englishmen…were cutting timbers 
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for houses” at the mouth of a river along the Gulf of Mexico.  Such activity would have 
paralleled British activity in other Spanish territories about the Caribbean.
161
 
Spanish governors could not deny that the contraband trade had an influence on 
their interests in the New World.  In Louisiana, each Spanish governor had to strike a 
balance between imperial policy and colonial realities.  Recognizing that he simply could 
not suppress the exchange, Ulloa acknowledged the value of the contraband trade to the 
colony, describing it as “the lifeblood of the colony.”162 His successor was not so lenient.  
Soon after his arrival in New Orleans, O‟Reilly became distressed at the entrenchment of 
British merchants, lamenting that he “found the English entirely in possession of the 
commerce of this colony.”163  Shortly thereafter, he expelled the British merchants from 
New Orleans.
164
  In his re-evaluation of Ulloa‟s defense policy, O‟Reilly disestablished 
Fort St. Louis de Natchez, arguing that “that post, far from stopping illegal trade, would 
be the best and only means of carrying it on...Our own people are the ones who can and 
always want to trade illegally, and that post, far from all control and inspection, would be 
a secure haven, protecting the greed of everyone employed there.”165  Like Ulloa before 
him, O‟Reilly realized that it was often in the colonists‟ best interest to participate in the 
contraband trade to negotiate their own survival and profit.  In a letter to his successor, 
Unzaga, O‟Reilly observed “that the provisions and goods needed by the people of 
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Louisiana, can be obtained only in exchange for products of that province.”166  Unzaga 
permitted the contraband to continue because he could not stop it and because the colony 
depended upon it.
167
   
Trade in flour best illustrates the tension between imperial policy and compromise 
at the local level.  From the time of the Seven Years War, Louisiana suffered from a 
scarcity of flour, a staple that British trade networks could readily provide.
168
  The last 
French governor Charles Phillipe Aubry, and Spanish governors Ulloa and O‟Reilly all 
relied upon the English to supply the colony.
169
  In 1767, Aubry had made the case to 
Ulloa that “An English vessel coming from Marseille and another from Amsterdam,” 
even though Spanish regulations did not permit it, should be allowed “to stop at the quay 
of the city to sell their merchandise there… as they carry flour, and oil, soap, and some 
other things absolutely necessary to the colony.” 170   
To complicate matters, colonists often traded their surplus grain to British West 
Florida merchants.  For example, Acadian colonists in the LaFourche District, such as a 
Mr. Arceneaux, “sold [grain] to the English of Manchac.”171  Because the Spanish had set 
price controls for grain in New Orleans, the Acadians faired better economically by 
trading their surplus with the British.
172
  During the corn and rice shortage of 1770 
Governor Luis de Unzaga bemoaned the fact that “the farmers do not wish to descend to 
                                                 
166
 O‟Reilly to Unzaga, April 4, 1770, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 165. 
167
 Gilbert C. Din, “Slavery in Louisiana‟s Florida Parishes under the Spanish Regime, 1779-1803,” in A 
Fierce and Fractious Frontier: The Curious Development of Louisiana’s Florida Parishes, 1699-2000, ed. 
Samuel C. Hyde, Jr., Forard by Hoddniger Carter III, (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 2004), 62. 
168
 “Philadelphia, March 19,” 19 March 1767, Pennsylvania Gazette (accessed 9 Oct 2009). 
169
 Clark, New Orleans, 164-5, 174-5. 
170
 Aubry to Ulloa, New Orleans, 16 December 1767, Papeles Procedentes de Cuba legajo 187, reel A[12]. 
171
 Judice to Unzaga, Lafourch, 23 Jan 1773, Papeles Procedentes de Cuba, Legajo 189A, Folio 470-1. 
172
 Carl A. Brasseaux, The Founding of New Acadia: The Beginnings of Acadian Life in Louisiana, 1765-
1803 (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1987), 131. 
 42 
sell them.”173  Although Nicolas Verret, the commandant at St. James along the 
Mississippi River, protested that the residents of his post had not traded the precious 
grain, he did not convince Unzaga who instructed Verret to inventory the grain on the 
farms in his district and to send excess grain to New Orleans.
174
  In the ensuing decades, 
colonists continued to engage in their own networks of trade—most of them officially 
impermissible—as the Spanish authorities continued in their attempts to prevent the 
activity. 
The need for flour created economic ties to the British Atlantic seaboard and to 
the Upper Mississippi Valley.  An unpredictable trade in flour between Illinois and New 
Orleans had persisted prior to the outbreak of the Seven Years War.
175
  From the 1760s 
on, British trade networks began to fill the void left by loss of trade with France and the 
diminution of trade with Illinois. Denis-Nicolas Foucault, the exiting French financial 
director of Louisiana, turned to Livingston, Randel, and Simpson of New York to import 
1,200 barrels of flour in 1767.
176
  During the Spanish period, trade with British merchants 
expanded to firms in Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York.
177
  A Northern Irishman 
who had immigrated to Philadelphia and later traded in the West Indies on behalf of 
several Philadelphia firms, Pollock became a merchant in his own right while in New 
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Orleans. During O‟Reilly‟s governorship, Oliver Pollock gained entrance to New Orleans 
and permission to trade in Louisiana when he offered a supply of flour from Baltimore.
178
  
Thereafter, Pollock continued to supply flour through trade with Philadelphia merchants 
Willing and Morris.  Pollock obtained two land grants on the Mississippi for Thomas 
Willing and Robert Morris, which he developed as rice plantations.  Willing‟s brother 
James immigrated to West Florida at Pollock‟s suggestion to enter a venture with 
Pollock, an indigo plantation on the Mississippi. 
179
  Pollock‟s connections also included 
Matthew Mather and John Stuart in London.
180
  In the 1770s, trade in flour from the 
Illinois country began to be renewed after the post war turbulence.  However, volatile 
colonial-Indian relations might have resulted in attacks on shipments.
181
   
In the years between the partition and the American Revolution, British trade 
networks extended into the Lower Mississippi Valley and thrived by the mid 1770s.  No 
longer a neglected region, the entire Mississippi Valley became increasingly contested 
territory, truly making Louisiana a borderland.
182
  As the Upper and Lower Mississippi 
Valley became increasingly economically intertwined, the significance of New Orleans 
as a port city also grew.
183
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With the coming of the American Revolution, Spanish officials reconsidered their 
policies and strategies for securing Louisiana as a border.  In doing so, they altered 
Spanish imperial commercial and economic policies and began to aid the rebel colonies 
on the Atlantic.  Long before directing military campaigns, the Spanish officials also 
opened up trade in Louisiana to the French and to additional Spanish ports, hoping to 
strengthen the colony and divert trade from the British.
184
  At the same time, residents of 
Spanish Louisiana continued to engage British merchants and planters in trade, 
continuing to undermine Spanish imperial plans. 
The appointment of Bernardo de Galvez signified a period of cooperation with the 
rebel British colonies.
185
  Louisiana‟s profile was elevated somewhat within the Spanish 
Empire as the colony became a likely base for a strike against British territory in North 
America.
186
   
This war-time contact officially opened New Orleans to distinctly American 
merchant networks.
187
  Captain George Gibson made several trips to New Orleans for 
gunpowder, which he then transported to Philadelphia, acting in conjunction with the 
Philadelphia merchants Willing and Morris.
188
  Oliver Pollock became an agent for the 
American Continental Congress and for Virginia and established a trade in gunpowder 
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with the Spanish as well as trafficking supplies to the Americans at posts in Illinois.
189
  
Indeed because of the war, merchants such as the Philadelphia based Reed and Forde 
turned to North American interior waterways to trade with New Orleans.  With his 
operations based in New Orleans, Pollock was able to incorporate trade with British West 
Floridians such as James Mather, Daniel Clark, Jr., and Benjamin Morgan.
190
  Morgan 
and Mather had a partnership from 1776 until 1783 based out of New Orleans.
191
 Planter 
Daniel Clark, Jr., sometimes of West Florida and sometimes of New Orleans also acted 
agent for Reed and Forde.  Evan Jones, a successful British merchant in New Orleans, for 
another Philadelphia firm, that of Thomas and John Clifford, which had done business for 
years with Liverpool, London, Bristol, Antigua, and Barbados.
192
  The New York firm of 
Nicholas Low and Co also sent an agent, Michael O‟Conner, to New Orleans, where the 
latter developed business relations with the influential New Orleans merchant Jean 
Baptiste Macarty.
193
  Clearly, American merchants had also begun to establish their 
business networks in the Lower Mississippi. 
At the same time, colonists of Louisiana continued to engage the British in trade.  
Two particular incidents shed light on the cargo of British vessels still plying the 
Mississippi.  On April 17, 1777, Galvez ordered the Lower Mississippi swept clear of 
                                                 
189
 Pollock to Piernas, New Orleans, 5 Sept 1780, Spain in the Mississippi Valley, vol1, 385; Clark, New 
Orleans, 204-5. 
190
 Clark, New Orleans, 204. 
191
 Dalrymple, Merchant of Manchac, 240n. 
192
 Dalrymple, Merchant of Manchac, n121; Clark, New Orleans, 234; “Just imported in the last Vessels 
from London and Liverpool,” 7 May 1761; “Just Imported to be Sold by Thomas Clifford” 20 May 1762; 
“The Ship Betsy, Seymour Hood Master, Is taking in for Bristol” 31 Oct 1771; “Just Imported to be Sold 
by Thomas Clifford and Sons,” 30 April 1772; “For Bristol, the Ship Betsey” 12 May 1773; “For Bristol, 
the Ship Sally, A New Vessel,” 4 May 1774; and “For Barbados,”24 Jan 1776, Pennsylvania Gazette 
(Accessed 30 Nov 2009).  
193
 Clark, New Orleans, 234; for more on Nicholas Low and Co, see Robert Ernst, “Nicholas Low: 
Merchant and Speculator in Post-Revolutionary New York,” New York History 75.4(1994): 356-372.  
 46 
British vessels.
194
  Then, in early 1778, in descending the Mississippi to New Orleans, 
James Willing and a party of patriots raided British West Florida plantations and attacked 
British vessels.
195
  These captured „floating warehouses‟ and the like carried skins, 
manufactured goods, and slaves.
196
 
Both the 1777 and 1778 incidents uncovered British slave-traders operating along 
the Mississippi.  Galvez turned up at least four slave trading vessels: a ship belonging to 
Morgan and Mather; the Hercules and Camille belonging to the firm of George and 
Robert Ross; and the Sally belonging to David Ross.  Willing‟s capture of cargo 
belonging to both Ross firms implicated them again in the slave trade the following year.   
The British had begun importing slaves to the Lower Mississippi Valley as early 
as 1766, and nearly a ship per month in 1776 entered the mouth of the Mississippi 
carrying slaves, including two ships that Mather owned, the Beggar’s Bennison and the 
Swallow.
197
  Louisiana colonists turned to British merchants to supply them with slaves 
as there existed virtually no legal avenue within the Spanish system for them to obtain 
slaves from outside of the colony until the war years.  Most, if not all of these vessels 
taken in the 1770s, had obtained slaves in Jamaica before setting sail for the 
Mississippi.
198
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 Jamaica had been a key port for British slave-traffickers to the Lower Mississippi 
Valley from the 1760s forward.  The Rosses had long participated in this contraband in 
human cargo.  As early as April of 1767, Robert Ross wrote Antonio de Ulloa offering 
his services: “Some of the principal merchants in the slave trade at Jamaica, having 
advised me to inquire whither my Negroes, and what number of them, would be wanted 
at New Orleans…expressing at the same time a desire to contract for the supply of 
them.”199  Ross did business with the Bristol—Kingston merchants Lewbridge Bright and 
David Duncomb.
200
  Some West Florida planter merchants outfitted vessels with goods 
and slaves in Jamaica before sailing to the Mississippi where they would sell some of 
their cargo to finance the establishment of a plantation in West Florida.  London 
merchant Edward Codrington sent slaves to the gulf coast and Mississippi from Jamaica 
over the course of the 1770s.  Bradley and Harrison was another slave-trading firm 
engaged in the traffic between Jamaica and the Mississippi.
201
  Through the 1790s, 
Jamaica remained a key “entrepôt” for many slaves taken by traders to the Gulf Coast 
with perhaps as many as sixteen vessels reaching Louisiana from Jamaica between 1772 
and 1776, such as the Philip, which reached the Mississippi in 1776.
202
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 Many of these merchants had direct ties to West Florida.  John Bradley owned 
land at Natchez, where he was a local trader beginning in 1767.
203
  George Harrison, 
Bradley‟s partner, was himself a merchant at Manchac.204  The Scottish brothers and 
merchants Robert, George, and David Ross all had land grants in West Florida and traded 
slaves throughout the region, at posts such as Pensacola, Natchez, Point Coupée, and 
New Orleans.
205
  Merchant John Fitzpatrick and Planter William Dunbar were smaller-
scale, West Florida resident slave traders, middlemen in the larger trade for firms those of 
the Ross brothers.
206
 
Spain officially entered the American Revolution in 1779.  Lead by Bernardo de 
Galvez, Spanish troops, including Louisiana militia, secured East and West Florida for 
the crown.
207
  Despite their economic ties to British merchants, traders, and planters, 
Louisiana colonists participated in the Gulf Coast campaigns that ended the British 
regime in the region.
208
  The colonists had relied upon British goods for survival and 
upon the British slave trade to bolster the labor force and thus the economy of Louisiana, 
all illegal activities in the eyes of Spanish policy-makers.  However, ironically, the 
contraband trade that had inserted itself into the frontier exchange economy of the region 
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may very well have enabled the Louisiana militia and leaders to succeed in their defeat of 
the British during the military campaigns. 
 With these latest geopolitical shifts, the Americans, Spanish officials, and 
residents of the Spanish borderlands grappled with ways to negotiate a new balance of 
power in North America.  Two central problems arose for the Spanish in their continued 
and persistent attempt to create a barrier out of Louisiana and the Floridas.  Firstly, 
Spanish officials recognized that the borderlands Indians, such as the Creek, were their 
most essential allies in acting as a buffer against American expansion.  Secondly, the 
Americans had begun during the war to request free navigation of the Mississippi. 
 Alliance with the Creek required a trade in manufacture goods that the Spanish 
Empire simply could not provide.  The British firm of Panton, Leslie and Co lobbied to 
fill the void.  William Panton, like other British loyalists, had fled South Carolina and 
Georgia for safe haven in Florida.
209
  The role that Panton proposed to play required the 
expansion of his own operations from East Florida to the Gulf Coast.  Panton argued that 
his firm could aid the Spanish in “supplying of the wants and needs of the Indians” 
because “our capital and credit, together with that of our connections in England, are 
fully adequate for the purpose and object proposed.” 210  In his letter to Jose de Galvez, 
East Florida Governor Zespedes argued that the business connection between Panton and 
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the Creek leader Alexander McGillivray would also serve Spanish interests.
211
  Panton 
and McGillivray‟s hostility toward the Americans further cemented their alliance and 
commitment to preventing the Americans from tapping into the fur trade.   
Over the course of the 1780s, Panton, Leslie and Company secured a de facto 
monopoly that strengthened economic ties between the Spanish borderlands and the 
British Atlantic.  Panton, Leslie and Co had long established ties with merchant houses 
throughout the British Atlantic with whom they continued to do business after the 
American Revolution.
212
  Even company warehouses were not restricted to continental 
North America, for the most important warehouse was at Nassau, as was the company 
headquarters.
213
  At first, the West Floridian firm Mather and Strother also competed for 
the Indian trade but withdrew after the initial enforcement of the 1787 Commercial 
Regulations.
214
  As the Spanish increasingly favored Panton, Leslie and Co, John Miller, 
previously a merchant at Manchac and associated with Mather and Strother, attempted to 
challenge the dominance of the firm by engaging in contraband himself off the Gulf 
Coast from his base in Nassau.
215
  Indeed, Nassau was an important port for the trade 
with the Indians.  It had become something of a refuge for loyalists, including Panton, as 
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well as men such as William Augustus Bowles and John Miller, enemies and rivals of 
Panton.  Miller employed Bowles to trade with the Indians.  For Bowles, who had lived 
among the Lower Creek, this improved his chances of creating a confederacy of sorts 
among the Southeastern Indians.
216
  However, the Spanish authorities turned increasingly 
to Panton, Leslie and Co to handle the Indian trade.
217
  Thus, British loyalist merchants 
became officially integrated into the Spanish system.  No longer did they solely have to 
resort to contraband, although the rivals of Panton, Leslie and Co did just that.   
Meanwhile, American pressure to open the Mississippi persisted.  During the 
Revolution, correspondence between Revolutionary leaders, such as Patrick Henry and 
Thomas Jefferson, and Bernardo de Galvez, revealed the intertwinement of alliances and 
commercial interests.
218
  The magnitude of American westward expansion, especially 
along waterways such as the Ohio and Cumberland, began to escalate dramatically.  
While Britain had sought after the Seven Years War to contain its colonists and to 
prevent their settlement beyond the line decreed by the Proclamation of 1763, the United 
States supported such development.  Rogue states, adventurers, and filibusterers also 
entered the mix, challenging the sovereignty of the Spanish holdings and of the United 
States.  The developing and constantly growing demographic and economic pressure 
forced the Spanish to reconfigure their policies, both at the imperial and at the local level 
in the potentially turbulent borderlands.  In 1784, Spain closed the Mississippi to the 
Americans, for Spain‟s policy toward the United States had taken a more hostile turn 
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after the Treaty of Versailles as the United States became the new territorial enemy to the 
North and East.
219
  
In 1787, anticipating a possible war with Britain, Spanish policy makers began to 
favor the Americans again.  They allowed American shipments to come to New Orleans 
and incorporated American settlers into defense designs.
220
  Indeed, on April 20, 1790 
Miro officially “permitted to every good Inhabitant to come down & settle …His most 
gracious Majesty generously grants the inhabitants of these Districts the trade with this 
town, & so they will be able to bring down Pelletry, tobacco, flower, provision, & every 
other produce of their country.”221  In short, Spain also hoped to profit from the 
expanding American economy.  News reached the Atlantic seaboard of the “general and 
uninterrupted trade has taken place between the inhabitants of that country [Kentucky] 
and those of the Spanish settlement at New Orleans.”222  By the close of 1790, reports 
reached New Orleans of boatload after boatload of goods and settlers coming down the 
Mississippi River.  Mostly flatboats, often from Kentucky and Pennsylvania, these 
vessels carried tobacco, meat, furs, bearskins, lime, tallow, lard, candles, saddles, 
whiskey, and of course flour.
223
 
By 1790, therefore, Spanish East Florida, West Florida, and Louisiana employed 
British loyalists to supply their Indian trade, attempting to hold the Americans at bay, at 
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the same time as these Spanish colonies incorporated Americans into trade, immigration, 
and defense strategy.   
Between 1765 and 1790, the frequent geopolitical shifts affecting the Lower 
Mississippi Valley forced nearly constant re-evaluation of Spanish commercial and 
defense policies at the same time as these shifts created a very fluid moment for residents 
of the region to negotiate their own balance of power.  The conflict between expanding 
British and American trade networks and Spanish imperial policy reveals the tension 
between imperial defense, colonial interests, and commerce, as well as the disconnect 
between imperial policies and realities of negotiating survival and alliances at the local 
colonial level.  During the second half of the eighteenth century, these trade networks 
increasingly linked the Gulf Coast and New Orleans and their hinterlands to the British 
Atlantic at the same time as American networks of trade strengthened commercial 
connections through the waterways of the interior North America.  While the trade 
included such basic commodities as flour and ammunition and the traffic of African 
slaves, because of the export of furs and the ever mounting American interest in bringing 
frontier surplus to market, Spanish officials and American settlers, merchants, and 
politicians became increasingly aware of the strategic importance of the port of New 
Orleans.  The previously neglected Mississippi Valley had become a borderland with 
internationally recognized strategic and economic value. 
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